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NOTES
strict scrutiny were used." The constitutionality of excluding aliens
from land ownership is just one of the many questions that the
Court must answer in trying to escape from the analytical morass
created by the Graham opinion. Hopefully, any new analytical struc-
ture adopted by the Court will rest on firmer ground.
Jan C. Holloway
AN OVERVIEW OF IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION:
Cannon v. University of Chicago
Plaintiff, a female denied admission to two private medical
schools, filed a complaint with the local office of the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) alleging that
both schools violated Title IX of the federal Education Amendments
of 1972' which prohibits sex discrimination in most educational insti-
tutions. When the department delayed taking any action on the com-
plaint, plaintiff filed a private suit in federal district court. The dis-
trict court held that plaintiff had no private cause of action under
Title IX because Congress, in providing for an administrative
scheme of enforcement within the provisions of the Act, intended
that to be the only available remedy for violation of the Act. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court decision. Reversing the lower court decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that a private litigant may pur-
sue a private cause of action under Title IX. Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
71. See note 4, supra. The state's interest might be weighty enough if non-
resident aliens were purchasing real property to such an extent that the health of the
economy might be affected.
One author has implied that the real thrust of the DeCanas holding, that a state
may, without preemption, forbid employers from hiring illegal aliens, see note 69,
supra, is indicated by the use of equal protection language in a preemption case. That
author suggests that the Court is indicating a lesser standard than strict scrutiny.
Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L.
REv. 1069, 1081 (1979). There may be a further question as to whether a non-resident
alien who is precluded from purchasing land in this country is even entitled to the
benefit of the equal protection clause. Id. at 1080-81. In Yick Wo the Court had said
only that equal protection was a pledge to "all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States." 118 U.S. at 369.
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976).
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An implied right of action is the "extension of a civil remedy to
one injured by another's breach of a statute or regulation not pro-
viding for such relief."2 The doctrine of implied private rights of ac-
tion originated in English law, providing the first detailed analysis
of the doctrine in 1854,' and was first applied by the United States
Supreme Court in the 1916 case of Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Rigsby.' While performing his normal duties, a railroad employee
was injured due to a defective handhold on a railroad car. The ex-
istence of the defect resulted in a violation of a federal safety stat-
ute, but the statute's enforcement mechanism only provided for the
imposition of criminal penalties. The employee sued the railroad,
which defended that the statute did not expressly confer a private
right to recover for injuries caused by a condition which violated
the regulatory provisions of the statute. Finding the principal object
of the statute to be the safety of employees and travelers,5 the
Court held that the implication of a private right of action was not
so precluded. In fact, the Court found the implication of a private
right of action "irresistible,"' stating that "[a] disregard of the com-
2. Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 285, 285 (1963). Implied rights of action must be distinguished from the con-
cepts of jurisdiction and standing. Jurisdiction is the judicial power to hear a case and
must be determined before addressing the question of standing or implied private
rights of action; standing is the determination whether a particular plaintiff has "such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See Comment, Private Rights of Ac-
tion Under Title IX, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 425, 429-30 (1978); Comment, Private
Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1392, 1408-11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Some Implications].
As implied rights of action supplement existing statutes and regulations, they
may be distinguished from the development of federal common law and implications of
rights of action based upon jurisdictional grants. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Mowe, Federal Statutes and Implied Private Actions, 55 OR.
L. REV. 3 (1976). This note treats only the implication of private rights of action from
federal statutes.
3. Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). For the development in English
law, see McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action: Reap-
praisal and Retrenchment, 80 DIcK. L. REV. 167, 168-69 (1975).
4. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). The recognition of such a right can be traced to Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in which he
asked: "If [Marbury] has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his
country afford him a remedy?", id. at 162, and he answered: "The government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It
will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for
the violation of a vested legal right." Id. at 163. The implication doctrine was recog-
nized in 1914 by Thayer in his article Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L.
REV. 317, 328 (1914).
5. 241 U.S. at 39.
6. Id. at 40.
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mand of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in
default is implied."7 The Court characterized its decision as an appli-
cation of the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium8 and reasoned that liability
to private suit is as potent a deterrent to violation of the statute as
criminal prosecution.'
Three theories have been developed as to when courts should
find implied rights of action: the statutory tort approach, the statu-
tory interpretation approach, and the statutory policy approach. The
statutory tort approach allows such a finding upon a showing that
the plaintiff is within the class for whose benefit and protection the
statute was enacted."° Since federal regulatory statutes are normally
enacted to protect certain classes of persons, a strict application of
this approach would result in findings of implied rights of action in
all instances in which the plaintiff falls within the protected class."
Under the statutory interpretation approach, the court may find an
implied right of action when it determines that Congress specifically
intended to create a private right of action. In order to make this
determination, the court must examine the language and legislative
history of the statute. Finally, the statutory policy approach re-
quires that the court examine the purpose for which the statute was
enacted. It may find an implied private right of action upon a deter-
mination that such an action could further the act's policy.'"
In the aftermath of the Rigsby decision, which had applied the
statutory tort approach without establishing any limitations upon
7. Id. at 39.
8. "Where there is a right there is a remedy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1363
(5th ed. 1979).
9. 241 U.S. at 42. In this early case the Court relied in part upon the tort doc-
trine that violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se in that a reasonable man
obeys the law and therefore one who violates the law must be negligent. See Martin v.
Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920) ("By the very terms of the hypothesis,
to omit, willfully or needlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of
another that he may be preserved in life and limb, is to fall short of the standard of
diligence to which those who live in organized society are under a duty to conform.").
Negligence per se cases must be distinguished from private actions based on
criminal violations in which the court creates a cause of action rather than adopting a
conclusive standard for an already existing common law cause of action. See Mowe,
supra note 2, at 4. The Court in Rigsby failed to make the distinction between the
remedies but was creating a private right of action from a federal statute that did not
provide such a remedy.
10. Note, Implication of Private Actions from Federal Statutes: From Borak to
Ash, 1 J. CORP. L. 371, 376 (1976).
11. Some Implications, supra note 2, at 1394.
12. Note, supra note 10, at 378.
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the use of this approach, the Supreme Court has followed an unsettled
path in attempting to prevent findings of implied rights of action in
all cases in which the plaintiff is a member of the protected class.
Using very broad language, the Court stated in dictum in Bell v.
Hood:3 "[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." 14 The Court has
also sought to limit the doctrine of implied private rights of action
as in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service
Co. 5 After refusing to examine the reasonableness of rate charges
determined by the Federal Power Commission under the Federal
Power Act," the Court declared that the petitioner "cannot litigate
in a judicial forum its general right to a reasonable rate, ignoring
the qualification that it shall be made specific only by exercise of
the Commission's judgment."'7
Many of the difficulties encountered by the Court in its attempt
to place limitations on the doctrine of implied private rights of ac-
tion stemmed from its inability to establish once and for all any one
of the alternatives to the statutory tort approach as the standard to
be used in determining the existence of an implied right of action. In
T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States8 the Court denied an implied private
right of action; three years later, in Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern
Freight-Ways Inc.,9 it allowed an implied private right of action
under the ,same Motor Carrier Act of 1935.0 The two cases present a
marked contrast. In TI.M.E. the Court found that the Act provided
administrative remedies which precluded judicial implication,2 while
13. 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (involving a suit brought against agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for damages for violations of the fourth amendment).
14. Id. at 684. There were two civil rights cases implying a private cause of action
in 1944. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and in
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944),
the Court held that black employees possessed an implied right of action under the
Railway Labor Act to remedy harm caused by discriminatory agreements between
management and a union.
15. 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (involving two power companies which earlier had been
under the same management but were now separate; one company sued, challenging
the reasonableness of rates charged to it by the other).
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (1948) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1976)).
17. 341 U.S. at 251.
18. 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (a suit by a shipper of goods challenging the reasonable-
ness of the carriers' charges).
19. 371 U.S. 84 (1962) (a suit over the routing practices of a common carrier).
20. Interstate Commerce Act, pt. II, 49 Stat. 543 (as amended) (codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1976)).
21. 359 U.S. at 469-72 (1959). The Court also found evidence from Senate hearings
that Congress considered and rejected a private cause of action. Id. at 477, citing
Hearings on S. 1194 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5, 11-12 (1949).
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finding in Hewitt-Robins that such an action would supply necessary
aid in the administration of the Act.22 Additionally, the T.I.M.E. deci-
sion evidenced doubt as to whether legislative history would sup-
port the implication of a private right of action, while the Hewitt-
Robins decision expressed concern with the fulfillment of the purpose
behind the Act regardless of whether a private cause of action was
contemplated.
A breakthrough in favor of implied private rights of action came
in the 1964 decision of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak." Borak, a stockholder
in the Case Company, sought to enjoin a merger between Case and
another company on the ground that Case had issued a false and
misleading proxy statement. Case argued that Congress did not
specifically provide a private right of action in enacting section 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,24 the statute alleged to have
been violated, and that it intended that statute to be enforced only
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Court disagreed,
finding that the Act places a great burden of enforcement on the
Commission and an implied right of action would ease that burden,
allowing for efficient operation of the Commission and the Act.2" Al-
though the Act does not specifically include a private right of action,
the purpose of the Act is to protect investors which "certainly im-
plies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve
that result."26 Therefore, courts must effectuate this congressional
purpose by providing the necessary remedies. 7 Essentially in Borak,
the Court abandoned the legislative intent approach in favor of a
functional test which, due to the difficulty in determining specific
legislative intent, lessened the burden on those asserting private
rights of action.
The trend away from the restrictive legislative intent approach
continued in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States,28 in
22. 371 U.S. at 88 (1962). The Court also stated:
Those who contended that no judicial remedy is available place much weight on
the fact . .. the Interstate Commerce Commission has primary jurisdiction in
routing practices . . . .To say, however, that such primary jurisdiction compels
the conclusion that the courts are without power to award damages in every in-
stance where the Commission may not award reparations by no means follows.
Id. See text at notes 15-17, supra, to note the change in the Court's handling of these
types of situations.
23. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
25. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
26. Id. at 432.
27. Id. at 433.
28. 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (a suit by the United States to recover the expenses in-
curred in removal of Wyandotte's sunken barge).
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which the Court looked to legislative history to determine if Con-
gress intended to preclude implication of a private remedy,29 rather
than to find positive indication of intent to create a private remedy.
By placing the legislative intent question in the negative, the Court
greatly eased the plaintiff's burden in attempting to establish an im-
plied right of action. Two years later, the Court employed a similar
negative formulation in its application of the functional approach. As
it had in Wyandotte, the Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections3"
found that a governmental enforcement provision in the act under
consideration3 did not preclude a private remedy. However, in
analyzing the need for a private right of action, the Court expanded
upon Borak. Whereas the plaintiff in Borak was required to show
that a private right of action was "necessary" for proper enforce-
ment of the act in question,"2 the plaintiff in Allen had only to show
that the effectiveness of the act in question would be "severely
hampered" without an implied right of action.3
Although these cases went far toward removing earlier, estab-
lished limitations on the finding of implied rights of action, a key
dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcoticss" signalled the beginning of a more conservative
approach. In that case, a suit by a citizen for damages against fed-
eral officers for violation of fourth amendment rights, the Court
made it clear that individuals have a private cause of action to pro-
tect rights secured for them by the Constitution. However, Chief
Justice Burger dissented, condemning such implication of private
rights of action as judicial legislation and as a breach of the separa:
tion of powers doctrine. 5 This was to be the rallying cry of subse-
quent courts.
Three years later, in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Na-
tional Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak),38 Chief Justice
Burger was in the majority when the Court seemingly retreated
from Borak and Allen in concluding that, since the act sued upon ex-
29. Id. at 200. The suit involved section 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33
U.S.C. § 409 (1976).
30. 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (a suit by individual voters challenging local voting enact-
ments under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
32. 377 U.S. at 433. See notes 23-27, supra, and accompanying text.
33. 393 U.S. at 556.
34. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
35. 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Dellinger, Of Rights and
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972) (judicial respon-
sibility in development of remedies implementing the Bill of Rights in Bivens).
36. 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (a suit by a group of passengers to enjoin Amtrak from
cancelling certain train routes).
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pressly conferred on the Attorney General a right to bring suit,
presumably Congress did not intend a private right of action. 7 An
examination of the legislative history reinforced the conclusion that
Congress intended to preclude civil remedies." The trend toward
limiting the finding of implied private rights of action continued in
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour"5 in which the Court
held that the recognition of a judicial remedy would be inconsistent
with the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.40 Furthermore,
the Court noted that the similarities between Barbour and Amtrak
were undeniable and therefore insurmountable.41 Because the act in
Barbour did not contain standards of conduct which a private action
could aid in enforcing, the Court distinguished it from Borak; the lat-
ter case involved section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
193442 which specified standards of private conduct. 3 Distinguishing
Allen on the basis that the large number of local governments re-
quired assistance of affected persons in order to effectuate congres-
sional goals, the Barbour Court emphasized that Congress had
established an effective regulatory mechanism in the Securities In-
vestor Protection Act which did not require the assistance of pri-
vate persons to accomplish its goal."
In 1975, the Supreme Court in the unanimous decision of Cort v.
Ash 45 established four criteria with which to determine the ex-
istence of an implied private right of action:
37. Id. at 458, citing Rail Passenger Service (Amtrak) Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 501-645 (1976). The Court also noted that a proposal to permit unlimited private
suits was made to the House Committee during hearings and rejected. 414 U.S. at
458-61. The Court considered whether implication of a private cause of action would be
consistent with the Act's purpose of achieving economic viability for basic rail
passenger systems, id. at 461, and concluded that it would not, id at 463.
38. Id. at 464-65. It is interesting to note that twelve days after its Amtrak deci-
sion the Court in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), allowed a private suit under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976), despite the ex-
press provision in the Act for an administrative enforcement mechanism, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-1 (1976).
39. 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (a suit by a brokerage customer to compel action under the
Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78111 (1976)). The Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) was established by Congress as a non-profit
membership corporation for the purpose of providing financial relief to the customers
of failing broker dealers with whom they had left cash or securities on deposit. The
question was whether there was an implied right of action under the Act to compel the
SIPC to exercise its statutory authority.
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78111 (1976).
41. 421 U.S. at 420.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
43. 421 U.S. at 423-24.
44. Id. at 425.
45. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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(1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted?
(2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, to create such a remedy or deny one?
(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme to imply a remedy for the plaintiff?
(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law? 6
The stockholder in Cort sued the corporation's chairman for breach
of a fiduciary duty in allowing the corporation to contribute to a
presidential campaign in violation of a criminal statute. Since Cort
could not have prevailed even under the loose test of Rigsby, the
Court could have easily disposed of the case. Instead, the Court
chose to establish certain criteria to be used in determining if a pri-
vate cause of action exists.
The Cort decision, in its attempt to embrace the middle ground
of the various philosophies by including a consideration of all of
them, succeeded only in establishing a malleable approach that can
be shaped to approximate any of the philosophies. The ambiguity
engendered by the decision is indicated by the liberal fear that it is
too conservative and the conservative fear that it is too liberal.
Also, the decision is unclear as to whether all four of the criteria
must be answered affirmatively to allow an implied right of action or
whether a balancing approach is appropriate. Commentators have
criticized the Cort decision as being overly restrictive 7 in that the
Court adopted an approach to statutory interpretation necessitating
that the judiciary take affirmative action only when the legislature
explicitly directs. Thus, absent express legislative intent to create
an implied private right of action, the Cort decision may require re-
jection of such an implied right of action.48
46. Id. at 78.
47. McMahon & Rodos, supra note 3, at 167-68, 177 & 184; Note, supra note 10, at
371-72 & 380-89; Note, Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes-The Emer-
gence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 446 (1976) (undeniably
more restrictive).
48. McMahon & Rodos, supra note 3, at 187. The commentators' alarms were
groundless, however, as evidenced by the large number of subsequent appellate court
decisions that have implied a private cause of action. Note, Implied Rights of Action to
Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378, 1379 n.7 &
1380 (1978).
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In the instant case, plaintiff filed a complaint with a local HEW
office in April 1975, alleging violations of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,' 9 which bans discrimination on the basis of sex
in all federally aided programs and institutions. She received an
acknowledgment, but was told that an investigation of her complaint
would not begin until early 1976. In June 1976 she was informed
that the local investigation had been completed but that the national
HEW office wished to conduct further studies." Cannon then filed
her present suit against the University of Chicago and Northwestern
University in federal district court. The district court dismissed the
action on grounds that Title IX sets forth a scheme of administra-
tive enforcement only and that although the Act provides for judi-
cial review of such administrative action, it does not authorize a
right of action against alleged violators." The court of appeals af-
firmed, determining that the existence of administrative enforce-
ment procedures precludes the existence of an implied private right
49. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976)). The
Act's central provision, section 1681, provides in part: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance .... " Title IX applies only to institutions of vocational
education, professional education, graduate education and public, institutions of under-
graduate education. 20 U.S.C § 1681(a)(1) (1976). Religious schools, military schools and
single-sex institutions are also exempted. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(3), (4) & (5) (1976). Con-
gress enacted Title IX in response to evidence demonstrating sex discrimination in
public and private education, H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1971),
modeling it after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6
(1976). 117 CONG. REC. 30,403-04, 30,407-08 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); id. at
39,251-52 (remarks of Rep. Mink). Title IX authorizes and directs each federal entity
extending educational assistance to issue regulations consistent with the Act's central
provision and provides for termination of assistance or any other means authorized by
law in case of non-compliance. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). Only the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) has published regulations concerning Title IX enforce-
ment. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex, in Education Programs and Activi-
ties Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1977).
HEW gave affected educational institutions one year to comply. For a full discussion of
HEW regulations to Title IX, see Kadzielski, Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972: Change or Continuity?, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 183, 188-96 (1977).
50. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1949 n.2 (1979). See generally
Note, Sex Discrimination- The Enforcement Provisions for Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 Can Be Strengthened to Make Title IX Regulations More Effec-
tive, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 207 (1975).
51. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
There were other charges brought by Cannon, id. at 1258, but they are beyond the
scope of this note. These other charges included violations of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-6 to -8
(1976), the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 292c & 292d (1976), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976).
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of action.52 The court briefly examined the legislative history and
determined that Congress did not intend to allow the "drastic
remedy of" individual lawsuits to be included within the Act's en-
forcement clause.5 Although HEW action might be slow and ineffec-
tive, the court found that individual suits cannot be a solution
because private actions may not effectively combat sex discrimina-
tion on a larger scale.54
The court of appeals reheard the case after Title IX was in-
cluded within the provision of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 197611 which, at the court's discretion, allows the pre-
vailing party a reasonable attorney's fees award as part of the costs
in cases brought under the included acts. Cannon argued that this
inclusion indicated congressional intent that there be an implied pri-
vate right of action as there would be no reason to allow a private
litigant attorney's fees if the litigant had no cause of action. How-
ever, the court reaffirmed its earlier decision holding that the inclu-
sion of Title IX in the Act does not support an implied private right
of action but merely provides for the possibility that future court
decisions would allow such an action for Title IX violations." Signifi-
cantly, HEW changed its position on rehearing and argued that Cort
required a finding of an implied right of action, perhaps recognizing
the ineffectiveness of the agency's enforcement mechanism. More-
over, another district court, in examining the same legislative
history, determined that an implied private right of action was con-
sistent with the congressional intent in enacting Title IX.17
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts in a decision writ-
ten by Justice Stevens, in which three members of the Court joined.
Following the four-part Cort analysis, the Court first found the
plaintiff to be in the "especial" class recognized as protected by the
statute."8 Secondly, the Court disagreed with the appellate court's
finding that Congress did not intend an implied private right of ac-
52. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 1976).
53. ld. at 1074. The court, however, stated that "a suit brought by a large group
to enforce the national interest against sexual discrimination may be possible under
Title IX." Id. at 1074 n.16.
54. Id. at 1075.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
56. 559 F.2d at 1079. The court also cited legislative history showing that the
court of appeals decision was mentioned and that Representative Railsback stated that
the attorney's fees bill "does not authorize or statutorily grant any private right of ac-
tion which does not now exist." I. at 1079-80, citing 122 CONG. REC. H35124 (1976)
(remarks of Rep. Railsback).
57. Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 781 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1976)
(dictum).
58. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1953-56 (1979).
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tion; legislative language indicated that Congress knew of an earlier
case implying a private right of action under Title VI and intended
for Title IX to be similarly treated, 9 since it had made no attempt
legislatively to overrule that earlier case. Thirdly, the Court found
the private remedy "is necessary or at least helpful to the ac-
complishment of the statutory purpose"; the Court was "decidedly
receptive to its implication under the statute."' Finally, the Court
summarily found that an implied right of action would not encroach
upon subject matter of exclusive concern to the states because Title
IX involves' expenditure of federal funds.6' Although the Court
would have preferred an express grant of a right of action, it per-
mitted the implied private right of action since all four criteria were
met.62
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in the
judgment but with certain qualifications which may affect future
decisions. While recognizing that Congress left to the courts the
decision concerning the implication of a private right of action in
this case, he warned that in the future the courts should be "ex-
tremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity
on the part of the Legislative Branch." 3 In his dissent, Justice
White, joined by Justice Blackmun, examined the legislative history
of Title IX and concluded that Congress intended the administrative
mechanism to be the only means of enforcement. 4 Disputing the ma-
jority's reading of the legislative history, he argued that Congress
assumed courts would allow a private right of action only when the
recipients of federal funds were acting under color of state law;"
thus, the courts should not create a new right of action against totally
private discrimination. Justice Powell, in a separate dissent, charged
that the Cort analysis provides a means of violating the separation
of powers doctrine by permitting a court to determine the desirabil-
ity of private enforcement using its own views rather than those of
Congress.6
Cannon does not settle conclusively the controversy regarding
the doctrine of implied private rights of action. In spite of the fact
59. Id. at 1956-61, citing 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972); 117 CONG. REC. 30,408 (1971)
(remarks of Sen. Bayh). The case referred to by the Court was Bossier Parish School
Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
60. 99 S. Ct. at 1961.
61. Id. at 1963.
62. Id. at 1967-68.
63. 99 S. Ct. at 1968 (Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
64. 99 S. Ct. at 1968-74 (White & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1972.
66. 99 S. Ct. at 1981 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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that the Court used the four Cort factors in arriving at its decision,
it did not determine whether all four are necessary to imply a
private cause of action. It is significant that the Court considered Ti-
tle IX an atypical case in which all four factors are present 7 and
suggested that it would have weighed the factors against each other
if they had not all supported implication of a private right of
action, 8 possibly indicating that all four factors need not be satisfied
to allow a private right of action. Cannon also demonstrates the
futility encountered in attempting to discover the intent of Congress
in passing certain legislation. The nature of the political process dic-
tates that Congress cannot legislate in anticipation of all possible
situations and must leave the difficult applications of the law to the
courts. An examination of the legislative history by both the majori-
ty and the dissent, with each side citing supportive history,
demonstrates the complexity of the problem of determining
legislative intent. A statement by Chief Justice Marshall almost 175
years ago still rings true today: "Where the mind labours to
discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from
which aid can be derived ...."69
Cannon can be viewed, however, as signalling a movement
toward a loosening of the standards necessary to imply a private
right of action. In discussing the third Cort factor, that no private
remedy should be implied if it would frustrate the legislative
scheme, the Court indicated that the remedy need not be necessary
but need only be "at least helpful" to the accomplishment of the
statutory purpose." This perhaps marks a return to the Allen ra-
tionale, which would allow courts to effectuate congressional goals
in the most beneficial manner regardless of an explicit enforcement
mechanism.
In Cannon, the Court noted congressional acquiescence to an im-
plied right of action under Title VI. This statement should settle
any debate concerning the validity of the court of appeals decision
which found that Title VI allows a private remedy."2 As a result of
67. 99 S. Ct. at 1968.
68. Id. at 1964.
69. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
70. 99 S. Ct. at 1961.
71. Id at 1956-61. The Court also stated that the relevant inquiry is not what
Congress correctly perceived as the state of the law but what its actual perception of
the law was. Id. at 1964, quoting Brown v. General Servs. Adm'n, 425 U.S. 820, 828
(1976).
72. The Court in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
left the question unanswered, since four Justices assumed for the purposes of the case
that Bakke had a right of action under Title VI. Id. at 2745. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974), the Court permitted a private suit under Title VI to force a school district
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the Court's determination, the most far reaching effect of the Can-
non decision may be upon the Rehabilitation Act of 1973" which pro-
hibits discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped indi-
viduals in federally funded programs.' Since the Rehabilitation Act
was patterned after Titles VI and IX" and similarly places great em-
phasis on the protection of individuals,"6 Cannon should require the
finding of an implied private right of action under this Act as well.
In the latest decision involving the Rehabilitation Act, Southeastern
Community College v. Davis," the Court disposed of the case on its
facts, finding that the refusal to admit a deaf student into nursing
school did not violate the Act, and declared it unnecessary to decide
if Davis had a private right of action."
Essentially, the decision in Cannon is the product of a broad
philosophical battle between judicial activism and judicial restraint.
Political realities force Congress to bypass controversial issues; time
pressures and limits of human foresight result in ineffective con-
gressional remedies in some instances. These factors render unwork-
able the characterization of statutory enactment as a totally self-
sufficient and exclusive legislative process.' It would appear that the
effectiveness of the legislative branch depends upon a recognition of
the power of the federal courts to evaluate the enforcement scheme
enacted by Congress in order to determine if it effectuates congres-
sional goals, and the duty of the federal courts to take appropriate
action when those goals cannot otherwise be achieved."0
The arguments of Justice Powell and others against the implied
private right of action are based upon the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. However, the implication of a private right of
action encroaches only slightly upon the legislative sphere. Congress
retains the sole prerogative to make laws; yet when an enforcement
scheme fails to adequately protect the intended beneficiaries, it
should be the duty of the courts to imply a cause of action to fulfill
receiving federal funds to comply with regulations prohibiting recipients from discrimi-
nating on the basis of race, but the Court did not discuss the question of a private
right of action. See note 38, supra.
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1976).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
75. See 120 CONG. REC. 30,532-34 (1974) (discussing patterning of Rehabilitation
Act to Titles VI and IX and the permitting of a judicial remedy through private
action).
76. Titles VI and IX protect every person from discrimination while the Rehabili-
tation Act protects every otherwise qualified handicapped individual.
77. 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979).
78. Id. at 2366 n.5.
79. Michkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law" Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957).
80. Id. at 799-800. See also Note, supra note 10, at 374.
19801 1023
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
those congressional goals.8 ' As advocated in Allen" the Court should
emphasize goals rather than means, since "implying a cause of ac-
tion may increase the likelihood of compliance with the statute by
giving victims incentive to assist in its enforcement and potential
violators, faced with an additional penalty, added reason to conform
their conduct to it.
83
Walter Joseph Hryszko
LOUISIANA'S PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY:
THE BASTARDIZED ISSUE
A concursus proceeding was brought by Tenneco Oil Company
to determine the ownership of oil and gas royalties owed under cer-
tain mineral leases. The trial court ruled that the Houstons,
possessors of the property, were entitled to payment of the
royalties in dispute. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed,'
interpreting article 3654(1) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure'
81. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. at 556-57; J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. at 432-33. If Congress had explicitly indicated in the legislation that
the courts were to determine the means of effectuating the goals established by the
legislative branch, then the Court's implication of a private cause of action would not
violate the doctrine of separation of powers. In fact, if Congress did leave this duty to
the courts, the separation of powers doctrine would be violated if the courts were to
shirk this responsibility. If the courts do err and imply a private cause of action when
none was intended by the enactment, Congress may overrule the courts by denying
the existence of such an implied action. Congress may also prevent judicial inter-
ference of an enforcement scheme by expressly denying private actions in the statute.
49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1976) (remedies conferred by statute are exclusive, Interstate Com-
merce Act, part I).
82. 393 U.S. at 556-57. See notes 30-31, supra and accompanying text.
83. Note, supra note 2, at 291.
1. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Houston, 364 So. 2d 1056 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
2. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3654 provides:
When the issue of ownership of immovable property or of a real right is
presented in an action for a declaratory judgment, or in a concursus, expropria-
tion, or similar proceeding, or the issue of the ownership of funds deposited in the
registry of the court and which belong to the owner of the immovable property or
of the real right is so presented, the court shall render judgment in favor of the
party:
(1) Who would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real
right in a possessory action, unless the adverse party makes out his title thereto;
or
(2) Who proves better title to the immovable property or real right, when
neither party would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or
real right in a possessory action.
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